Soc. Yes, for so I must. Pol. Then do you consider that a man who puts another to death as he thinks fit, and justly puts him to death, is wretched and pitiable? Soc. Not I; but not enviable either. Pol. Did you not say just now that he was wretched? Soc. Only he who unjustly put some one to death, my friend, and I called him pitiable as well: if he acted justly, then he is unenviable. Pol. I suppose, at any rate, the man who is put to death unjustly is both pitiable and wretched. Soc. Less so than he who puts him to death, Polus, and less so than he who is put to death justly. Pol. In what way can that be, Socrates ? Soc. In this, that to do wrong is the greatest of evils. Pol. What, is this the greatest? Is not to suffer wrong a greater? Soc. By no means. Pol. Then would you wish rather to suffer wrong than to do it? Soc.
The quote: I should wish neither, for my own part; but if it were necessary either to do wrong or to suffer it, I should choose to suffer rather than do it.
Pol. Then you would not accept a despot’s power? Soc. No, if you mean by a despot’s power the same as I do. Pol. Why, what I mean is, as I did just now, the liberty of doing anything one thinks fit in one’s city—putting people to death and expelling them and doing everything at one’s own discretion. Soc. My gifted friend, let me speak, and you shall take me to task in your turn.